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Abstract: 
In Hong Kong, dwellings are fitted with neat and tidy paintings, well decorated floor and wall tiles.
Equipped with world–renowned kitchen and bathroom appliance, housing owners can move in with a bag 
of  cloths.  Builders  in  China,  however,  only  provide  fundamental  elements  such  as  windows,  doors, 
ironmongery and grayish wall. By the time home purchasers receive their dwellings, they need to do a lot 
of shopping before they can move in. They need to buy water closet, tiles, towel rings and so on. Scope of 
services provided by Hong Kong developers is much wider than those in China’s. Ronald Coase, Nobel 
economist 1991 addresses two questions in his 1937 paper: why firms exist and what determines their scale 
and scope. What are the major determining factors which affect the size of the developers and their scope 
of services? Few or even no paper has studied this issue. This paper reviews that unpredictable rules and 
regulations couple with poor law drafting decrease firms’ incentive in vertical integration.
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1. Introduction
Close–to–ideal fully–equipped dwellings have provided much convenience to busy nest–
builders in Hong Kong. It is not unusual to find the first hand dwellings in Hong Kong with 
creamy  white,  tiled  floor,  floor–to–ceiling  windows  for  unobstructed  harbor  views,  quality 
appliances and fittings in kitchen and bathroom from renowned manufacturers. Fitted with high 
technology, residents can operate electrical appliance via PDA. There is, however, a complete 
different scenario in China. Builders only provide flats with no wall and file tiles and coverings
for the electric socket. One of the major differences lie in the developers of two places is the 
scope of services provided or the size of the firms. Developers in Hong Kong provided a wide 
scope of services, such as provisions of painting services, decoration services etc. Developers in 
china simply  provide  concreting  and  steel  services  and  nothing  else.  Internal  contract  of 
developers  in  Hong  Kong  is  much  more  complicated  than  those  in  China.  “Size”  of  the 
developers in Hong Kong is also larger. The question lies here is: what determine the size of 
scope  of  services  of  the  firm? While  Nobel  winner  Coase  provided  an  explaination  as 
“differences in transaction costs”, this paper will try to shed light on how differences in legal 
regulations and perspective on laws and regulations affect the costs of transactions and size and 
scope of the firms in turn.
2. Bare residential units in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Haerbin: a general overview 
While most of the dwellings in China are bare flats without any fittings, all the residential 
units are well–equipped with fittings. The table below illustrates the percentage of bare flats in 
Shanghai and Haerbin, two major provinces in China and Hong Kong. 
Table 1. Percentage of bare flats in Shanghai, Haerbin and Hong Kong
% of bare flats
in Shanghai
% of bare flats
in Haerbin
% of bare flats
in Hong Kong
2001 84.8 100 0
2002 81.4 100 0Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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2003 79.3 93.8 0
2004 78.3 78.3 0
2005 82.9 89.2 0
Source: (Li, 2008b)
3. The nature and size of the firm
Coase comments in his recent paper “The firm …is very extraordinary given that most 
resources in a modern economic system are employed within firms, with how these resources are 
used  dependent  on  administrative  decisions  and  not  directly  on  the  operation  of  a  market. 
Consequently, the efficiency of the economic system depends to a very considerable extent on how 
these organizations conduct their affairs, particularly, of course, the modern corporation [Coase, 
(2008)].” The existence of firm has arose interests of many economists, the classical economists, 
neo institutional economists, resource based economists and so on. While Milton Freidman has 
stated the importance of free to choose, why would there be some individuals would like to give 
up the precious opportunity to be the director of resources but choose to be directed, supervised 
or monitored instead?
Clues might be able to find in Adam Simth’s first chapter in Wealth of Nation “First, the 
improvement of the dexterity of the workman necessary increases the quantity of the work he can 
perform;  and  the  division  of  labour,  by  reducing  every  man’s  business  to  some  one  simple 
operation, and by making this operation the sole employment of his life, necessarily increases 
very much the dexterity of the workman …Secondly, the advantage which is gained by saving the 
time commonly lost in passing from one sort of work to another…”[Smith, (2000)] From Smith’s 
perspective, the establishment of firm can be explained by the merits provided by the division of 
labour: time saving and learning by doing.
Other classic economists such as Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall have agreed that firm is 
a  legal  entity  whose  law  prescribes  its  boundaries. Smith  is  aware  of  the  impact  of  legal 
regulations on the nature of the firm: he has includes a section in wealth of nation where he 
compares  the  minimally  regulated  joint–stock  companies  of  his  time  and  the  corporations. 
Clearly, Alfred Marshall holds the view that legislation in 19
th century had facilitated its joint 
stock company’s capacity to obtain capital for investment. Early institutional economists include 
John Commons also shed light on the importance of legal foundations on the firm. 
In 1937, Coase has written a paper which proposes that differences in costs of operating 
institutions lead to the emergence of a firm which supersedes the market. While transactions in 
market involve products or commodities, transactions within a firm involve factors of production.
By replacing of a product market by a factor market, Firm can save much costs of transaction.
Nevertheless, Coase has never defined the term “firm” nor provide “a clear distinction between 
factor and product market [Coase, (1937)]. The most obvious of transaction by means of market 
is costs of discovering the relevant prices. In the absence of a firm, each input owner needs to 
find the price for every single component. If that is the case, costs of the final product will be 
enormously high. One of the possible ways to solve the problem is the emergence of a central 
agent who is responsible for contracting each input owners. This agent, in return, receives a price 
for his hard work. All these many contracts are then reduced into one single contract [Cheung, 
(1983)].
Based  on  Coase’s  paper,  Steven  Cheung  in  1983  suggests  that  each  input  owners  of 
productive input has the option of (1) producing and selling goods by himself, (2) selling his 
productive inputs entirely, or (3) giving up his use of his input and entering into a contractual 
arrangement with an agent in exchange for his income. Firm is a typical example of the third 
option.  It  emerges  when  the  entrepreneur  who  holds  a  limited  set  of  use  rights  by  contract 
directing  the  production  activities  without  immediate  reference  to  the  price  of  every  single 
economic activity. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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Have there been no private property rights and therefore none of the above choices are 
available, it is easy to realize why the worker or a resource owner is directed by a firm owner 
instead of market prices. Nevertheless, by the time there are private property rights – which really 
exist in our society; the question has become difficult to answer: nobody would like to give up his 
individual’ rights in exchange for supervised, directed and pushed by the employer at all. What is
resource owner’s motivation behind to surrender his own right?  To reduce transaction costs 
[Cheung, (1983)]. 
Steven Cheung proposes that there is a second factor which apparently have not considered 
by Coase is the information cost of knowing a product. It is often difficult for a layman to know 
the usage of each component or part. As Cheung comments “[r]eaching agreement on the price 
of a spring inside a camera incurs a proportionately higher cost than does the camera. Although 
the consumer has the final say in assessing the worth of the whole product, he cannot be expected 
to recognize the value of each component part–he may not even know what some of them are or 
even that they exist. It simply costs too much to learn about everything in every commodity we 
buy…for a component which by itself has no readily identifiable value, agreement on price is less 
costly  between  specialists  and  input  owners  than  it  would  be  between  input  owners  and 
consumers or between specialists and consumers. The one who produces component parts tends 
to know more about them than the one who consumes” [Cheung, (1983)].
He then continues to elaborate on the reasons for a firm to emerge” measurement costs. 
Whether the deal is between and an input owner and his agent, an agent and a customer, or a 
customer  and  input  owner,  some  attributes  or  characteristics  or  must  be  measured  in  every 
transaction. Generally speaking, there are 3 circumstances which the presence of firm is much 
more efficient: 1. some of the activities to be performed cannot be predetermined in advance 
conveniently; 2. the activities performed by an input owner vary frequently or 3) change greatly, 
it  then  becomes  more  economical  to  surrender  any  direct  measurement  activities,  substitute 
another measurement to serve as a proxy [Cheung, (1983)].
On top of the aforementioned reasons, there is also a problem of separating contributions 
generates cost in reaching price agreement. By the time input owners work together, contribution 
of each may not be easily delineated in some situations. It is also likely that each of them may 
claim  more  than  he  deserves.  Although  competition  among  resource  owners  lowers  all  the 
unnecessary excessive claims,  the  problem  cannot  be totally eliminated. An agent who  hires 
workers may therefore offer a salary for each on all or nothing basis by a proxy measurement 
instead of contributing itself [Cheung, (1983)].
This, however, is heavily criticized by Hodgson (1988): “The nature of the firm is not 
simply a minimiser of transaction costs, but a kind of protective enclave from the potentially 
volatile and sometimes destructive, ravaging speculation of a competitive market . . . Habits and 
traditions  within  the  firm  are  necessarily  more  enduring  because  they  embody  skills  and 
information which cannot always or easily be codified or made subject to rational calculus. What 
the  firm  achieves  is  an  institutionalization  of  these  rules  and  routines  within  a  durable 
organizational  structure.  In  consequence  they  are  given  some  degree  of  permanence,  and 
guarded to some extent from the moody waves of speculation in the market” [Hodgson, (1988)].
Powell (1990), on the other hand, argues that “transactions that involve uncertainty about 
their outcome, that recur frequently and require substantial "transaction–specific investments" of 
money, time or energy that cannot be easily transferred are more likely to take place within 
hierarchically organized firms. Exchanges that are straightforward, non–repetitive and require no 
transaction– specific investment will take place across a market interface. Hence transactions are 
moved out of markets into hierarchies as knowledge specific to the transaction (asset specificity) 
builds up. When this occurs, the inefficiencies of bureaucratic organization are preferred to the 
relatively greater costs of market transactions. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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There are two reasons for this: 1. bounded rationality – the inability of economic actors to 
write contracts that cover all possible contingencies; when transactions are internalize, there is 
little  need  to  anticipate  such  contingencies  since  they  can  be  handled  within  the  firm’s” 
governance structure”; and 2. opportunism – the rational pursuit by economic actors of their own 
advantage.
Conner and Prahalad (1996) suggests that one of the major differences between firm and 
market is the existence of employer–employee relation or the so–called authority, the existence of 
authority in the employer over his employee. In firm the latter gives up his right of autonomy and 
are directed by the former one.  
As  early  as  1957,  Simon  suggests  that  we  are  all  under  the  constraint  of  bounded 
rationality;  nobody  has  got  perfect  information  and  knowledge.  In  market  individuals  are 
directors of their own. Transactions between them imply an establishment of a market contract 
which lists out the compensations and obligations of both parties. Once the contract terms are 
established, both parties are  obliged to fulfill them.
Source: (Conner and Prahalad (1996)
Figure 1 Market contracting and firm organisation. 
In firm, relations between the two parties are different. Z has become the employer of Y. Z 
has become the legal owner of the firm. On the other hand, it is also natural to consider Z as the 
legal owner of the firm. Z can be the sole shareholder in case the firm is a corporation or the 
owner given that the firm is a sole proprietorship. Hence, we may concede that Z is the residual 
claimant of a firm.
On top of the prevailing view of transaction costs reduction, the emergence of firm – rather 
than market transactions – according to Cordes et al (2008) is to internalize scale economies as 
well  as  to  reduce  post–contractual  hazard.  Kay  (2000)  argues  instead  that  the  character  of 
decisions that influences and defines nature of firms.
Apart from the nature of the firm, it has also been long regarded as "chronic puzzle” to an 
explanation on the limits of firm size: why couldn’t we find one single giant firm does everything 
but a collection of small firms? We all know that bulk purchase can enable us to obtain a bargain 
price. It is natural, therefore, to see someone who buys a pack of six bottles lemon tea instead of 
one single bottle even they do not drink all at once. Large firms are in a relatively strong position 
in  seeking  source  of  finance  for  their  operations.  In  sharp  contrast,  small  firms  often  face 
difficulty in securing external finance [Pollard, (2003)]. One of the various obvious reasons for 
limited firm size can be explained by the concept of efficiency as Knight Comments: 
“The relation between efficiency and size is one of the most serious problems of theory, 
being in contrast with the relation for a plant, largely a matter of personality and historical 
accident rather than of intelligible general principles…the possibility of monopoly gain offers a 
powerful incentive to continuous and unlimited expansion of the firm, which force must be offset 
by  some  equally  powerful  one  making  for  decreased  efficiency  (in  the  production  of  money 
income) with growth in size, if even boundary competition is to exist”[Coase, (1937)].
Whilst Knight views the size of firm is determined by efficiency of the organization, Coase 
shares similar idea “The reason for an organization of the business unit which, the business unit, Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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I said in exist when anyone produced to sell in the market. This implied exchange and exchange 
specialization. But this specialization is a specialization of the business unit – it needs imply no 
specialization  within  the  business  unit…Why  there  are  two  separate  firms?  Two  reasons  –
1.Increasing cost for each additional market transaction until cost of organizing marginal market 
transaction was equal to marketing cost that of organization. 2.That as transaction increased, 
might not carry out its object of reproducing market conditions [Coase, (1988)].”
Cordes et al. (2008), on the other hand, proposes firm size is determined by opportunistic 
behavior. If the costs of opportunistic behavior are low, relatively few cooperative employees can 
support a large firm. It is only via monitoring combined with employment contracts that appeal to 
an agent’s self interest that shirking may be mitigated. When firm size keeps small, a higher level 
of cooperation can be maintained inside the group. 
4. Legal system in China and Hong Kong: a general overview
“If we move from a regime of zero transaction costs to one of positive transaction costs, 
what becomes immediately clear is the crucial importance of the legal system in this new world. I 
explained in “The Problem of Social Cost” that what are traded on the market are not, as is often 
supposed by economists, physical entities, but the rights to perform certain actions, and the rights 
which individuals possess are established by the legal system [Coase, (2008)].”
China  has  drafted  and  implemented  laws  and  regulations  to  govern  the  construction 
activities. It mainly consists of the laws and regulations at three levels. The highest levels of laws 
which govern the construction industry include the Construction Law 1997 and the Bidding and 
Tendering Law 1999, two laws laid down by the People’s Republic of China. 
The Construction Law 1997 is the most important law among all laws and regulations 
which concern about construction industry. It provides legal framework for construction activities 
and its legal effect overrides all the other construction rules and regulations. 
The Construction Law is consisted of 8 chapters and 85 articles which mainly concern 
about bidding. The administrative regulations (xingzheng fagui) belongs to the second level of 
laws concerning are the disseminated by the State Council of PRC. They are mainly concerned 
about several important issues, e.g. registered architects regulations, construction project quality 
management  and  so  on.  At  the  third  level,  departmental  regulations  and  rules  about  human 
relations are deal. They are promulgated by the Ministry of Construction. 
Although  China  has  drafted,  enacted  and  implemented  numerous  laws,  rules  and 
regulations, nearly none is enforced completely [Luo, (2007)] There are several characteristics in 
Chinese legal rules and regulations: 1. Flexibility: In China, the major objective for legal rules 
and regulations is to develop the market economy by increasing certainty. By improving the 
certainty in legal rules, more foreign investors come to invest and speed up the economic progress 
in turn. Some researchers in law in China concede that it flexibility allows officials to deal with 
different  local  circumstances.  Nevertheless,  because  of  such  flexibility,  it  brings  preferential 
treatment by human connections and corruption [Lam, and Chen, (2004)]. 2. Fragmentation of 
regulatory departments and bureaus: Usually, before a piece of legislation is put into practice in 
China, the Central government chooses some areas for testing the effectiveness of the new law 
and  delegate  authority  to  these  local  officials  so  that  they  can  flexibly  exercise  the  power 
according to local circumstances. Nevertheless, it is also Because of such flexibility, laws become 
uncertain. 3. Ambiguity in regulations and laws drafting: to meet the fast growing economy in 
China, legal drafters have to draft laws quickly for business activities. Nevertheless, also because 
of this reason, they do not have enough time to consider every facet in laws and regulations. 
Legal rules and regulations were often drafted ambiguously. There is only a general overview 
without detail consideration. Making every piece of legislation can be explained in two ways 
[Lam, and Chen, (2004)]. 4. Legal rules are swords of the central government, instead of shields 
of the general public. Similar to the traditional emperors, Marxist rulers only consider laws as a Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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tool  which  help  achieve  the  goal  of  certain  policy  enforcement  and  targets  of  the  Chinese 
Communist Party. This is in sharp contrast to the role of law in UK and some other countries: 
laws are not instruments to restrain state power, but an instrument of it [Zhao, and Fu, (1999)]. 
There is, however, a complete different story in Hong Kong. Although Hong Kong has a 
relatively short history, her legal system is well–developed. It follows common law system, i.e. 
any precedents in court become the future legal rules. Any ambiguity in rules and regulations can 
be clarified by way of this. Fragmentation of legal rules never exists in Hong Kong. Largely 
because of its small geographical areas, it  is unnecessary to  further divide this tiny dot  into 
different small pieces of area for ruling. Interpretation of laws and regulations were never in hand 
of politicians and ruling body, but in the hand of judges who are well–trained in law with years of 
experiences in handling court cases. After all, legislations, rules and regulations in Hong Kong 
are not the swords of the high rank rulers, but the shields of the general public. From this aspect, 
it is quite similar to the idea of provisions of laws in many European countries.
Failure of the legal systems can be explained by both the inherent problem in legal system 
as well as the informal system “law serves a social order, i.e. the relations between individuals, 
and actions which affect nobody but the individuals, who perform them ought not to be subject to 
the control of law, however strongly they may be regulated by custom and morals” [Hayek, 
(1979)]. 
Construction laws and practices in China have also been influenced heavily by its unique 
culture [Lam and Chen, (2004)]. Confucianism Chinese culture has been predominately major 
thought for most of the time in Chinese history. Although Confucian has brought along many 
good aspects to Chinese, e.g, it has build up the foundation of good human relations between 
friends, sons and fathers, employers and employees and so on. Confucian’s thinking has under 
valued the importance of law. Chinese kids were told that ethical rules are more important than 
laws compliance [Viet, (2005)].
Laozi said” the more restrictions and prohibitions there are in the world, the poorer the 
people will be the more laws that more promulgated, the more thieve and bandits there will be” 
[Gunde, (2002)].
In most of the villages in China, whenever there is some crimes happen. The one who is 
caught usually will not be sent to the police station first but to the village leader. The village 
leader and/or senior village members will decide the method of punishments. Besides, they are 
also of the view that “the law is dead, human are alive”, laws have to be adjusted according to 
different situations [Bhatia, (1974)]. In view of all the aforementioned characteristics, people 
seldom treat the terms as in contract seriously. Contracts between contractors and developers are 
of no exception. Not only the home buyers find the quality of the final products unacceptable, the 
developers also can hardly accept the workmanship of the contractors.
Traditionally, government officials have the highest and absolute power. The officials have 
“two mouths” while the ordinary citizen has one mouth only. “Shuo Wen Jie Zi”, the first and the 
most famous books written to interpret the origin of Chinese words, suggests that all the words 
are developed from pictures with a meaning. An intrinsic meaning from these words can be 
discovered by looking at the words. Below is a Chinese word of “government officials” in China, 
there is a “ ” part which visualises the hat of the government officials (government officials in 
the past need to wear hat to work every day and their hats represent the position of their job), two 
“ ” are the mouths of the officials. While the ordinary person only has one mouth, these officials 
have two mouths. Such word does reveal the absolute power of officials: they voices override all 
those general public [Li, (2008a)]. Vague terms in laws in China allow the officials to insert their 
own  interpretation  and  the  general  public  have  no  say  at  all.  The  toughest  battle  that  most 
plaintiffs face is persuading the court to accept the case. Citizens in China cannot sue the Party 
committee or secretary [O'Brien, and Li, (2005)]. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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All they can do is to follow the instructions from these officials for most of the time. 
Developers are not of exceptions. In view of the ever changing markets in China, the central 
government has often inserted new rules and laws suddenly. 
For instance, by the time Olympic Games was held, some of the residential owners were 
forced to sell their units to the central government and some shop sellers were forced to close 
their shops. Laws were the tools of the ruling body in achieving certain objectives only. In view 
of the ever changing, unpredictable rules and regulations, reduction in contracting with too many 
contractors are one of the ways to decrease the risks in doing their business.
Source: (Li, 2008a).
Figure 1. The Chinese word of government officials “Guan” on the left and two Chinses words 
“mouths” “kou” on the right. 
There is a totally different story in Hong Kong. It usually takes more than a year to pass a 
piece of legislations. Have there been any sudden changes in rules, politicians will help these 
shops and sellers to voice the problem. The power of the government is also limited by Basic 
Law,  common  law  and  legislations.  Rules  and  regulations,  from  this  perspective,  are  highly 
predictable. Black box decisions on legislations never happen in Hong Kong at present, all the 
legislators’ opinions are recorded in black and white and uploaded on the web of the Hong Kong 
Legislative  Council.  Rules  and  regulations,  certainly  override  the  ethical  rules  in  case  of 
contradictions.
5. Implications
Because  of  these  inherent  problems  in  legal  drafting,  highly  unpredictable  rules  and 
regulations, information costs in knowing and predicting the future change in regulations is high.
Developers  in  China  protect  themselves  by  lowering  the  number  of  contracts  with  different 
contractors to decrease their risks. Have they provided wall paintings, floor tiles, washing basins, 
kitchen TV etc, they have to supervise them closely –– contractors can easily find ways to escape 
their responsibilities –– developers have to spend an enormously high supervision costs to ensure 
contractors’ workmanship are up to standard. Scope of services provided by these developers has 
been limited by the risks and uncertainty, costs of predicting the quality of the final products. If 
we consider Steven Cheung’s idea that the firm is a kind of contractual relation, size of the 
developers in  China is  relatively small – limited on the  contract with the steel and concrete 
suppliers only.
Developers  in  Hong  Kong,  however,  are  highly  protected  by  law.  By  the  time  the 
contractors fail to do an up–to–standard piece of work. There are many ways to sue or get back 
the  money  from  these  contractors.  Purchasing  kitchen  TV,  washing  basin,  PDA  facilities, 
contracting with wall and floor tiles contractors etc are not regarded or treated as a high risk 
activities  from  developers’  perspectives,  cost  of  knowing  the  final  product  provided  by 
contractors are low. Rather, it is a good marketing strategy to attract potential buyers and a good Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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opportunity to capture any potential gain from these commercial activities. Therefore, they are 
willing to provide a wide scope of services. “Size” of the firms is therefore larger.
6. Conclusions
The nature and size of the firm has arose the interests of many economists. Adam Smith 
provided  the  first  explanation  by  the  benefit  in  division  of labor.  Hundred years  later,  neo–
institutional economists shed light on transaction costs. Such explanation also opens the door for 
identifying reasons for “several small firms” instead of “one single giant firm”. Whilst previous 
literature suggests that choice of firm instead of market rests in the existence of costs of knowing 
the product, measurement and discovering the relevant price, this paper advocates that costs of 
predicting  and  interpreting  legal  rules  and  regulations  limit  the  size  of  the  firm. To  avoid 
unnecessary losses, developers reduce the number of contracts with suppliers and contractors. 
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